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FAMILY LAW: PARENT AND CHILD
Ellen K. Solender*
I. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
OR the past several sessions the emphasis of the Texas legislature has
been on increasing the effectiveness of the collection of child support.
The special session of the 72nd Legislature made a number of changes
in the law. The most significant is subchapter F, Child Support Lien.I It is
now possible to perfect child support liens on all personal and real property
that is not exempt under the Texas Constitution, so that, for example, if an
obligor is collecting workers' compensation, the payments may be attached. 2
In the regular session the legislature added prejudgment interest that may
have accrued on payments not made prior to a judgment 3 to the amount of
back child support owed. When setting the amount of child support if there
is no information concerning the earnings of the obligor or obligee, a mini-
mum wage is presumed. 4 Also, any variation from the percentage support
guidelines must be explained by the court. 5
The legislature lowered the age at which a child should be consulted about
custody from fourteen to twelve years.6 It also made possible a modification
of a sole managing conservatorship decree when the child has been volunta-
rily placed with another for more than six months.7 Previously the period of
time was more than one year.
The above text represents merely an overview of recent legislative
changes. A more complete and detailed listing of changes to the Family
Code is contained in the State Bar Family Law Section Reports. 8 The best
way, however, to be certain you are using the current version of the law is to
check the most recent editions of the statutes.
II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
There were no decisions by the United States Supreme Court affecting the
ordinary practice of family law during the last term. The Court, however,
recently turned down an opportunity to interpret the Parental Kidnapping
* A.B., Oberlin College; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Professor of Law, South-
ern Methodist University.
I. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.971-.983 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
2. Id. § 14.972(b)-(c).
3. Id. § 14.34 (West 1991).
4. Id. § 14.053(k).
5. Id. § 14.057b).
6. Id. §§ 14.021(e)(6), 14.07(a), 14.08(g)(1).
7. Id. § 14.08(c)(4).
8. Vol. 91-2 Summer Legislation Edition and Vol. 91-3 Fall Legislation Edition, Part II.
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Jurisdiction Act.9 The review would have involved resolving a conflict in
jurisdiction between California and Wisconsin. 10 The Court in Thompson v.
Thompson 11 held that it is the only forum for resolution of jurisdictional
conflicts of this sort, so the parties were left deadlocked, without a remedy. 12
III. STATUS
Schools and courts continue to be troubled about how to implement the
Education of Handicapped Act.13 In a case involving an emotionally dis-
turbed child, the district court granted an injunction to prevent the child
from attending regular classes as had been provided in his individual educa-
tion program. 14 The court based the decision on evidence concerning the
student's threat of imminent danger to himself and others. 15 The court re-
tained jurisdiction so that it could order further relief, should it be needed.
In Lindsey v. State 16 a case concerning a deaf child, the parents alleged that
the state had harmed the child by failing to provide a structured education
as mandated by the Texas Education Code. 17 Although the parents had re-
ceived permission to sue the state, ' 8 the court of appeals held that the state
was immune from liability, since there was no pre-existing law on which to
base the parents' claim. 19
Two recent cases were brought against Texas school districts. In the first,
the attorney general held that a car telephone is not a paging device as de-
fined by the Texas Education Code,20 but that, if the phones are disruptive,
the school district has the authority to regulate the phones. 21 In the second
case, a student who was suspended for violating a school's drug policy sued
the district for disciplining him.22 The district court found that the school
district had complied with procedural due process and that the district had
met its duty by providing a full range of hearings before taking action.23
A trial court found that a fourteen year-old boy had maliciously assaulted
the defendant, but denied the jury's award of exemplary damages. The ap-
pellate court held that a fourteen year-old is capable of acting with malice
and reinstated the jury's award. 24 The appeals court based its decision on
the fact that the Family Code provides that a parent may be liable for the
9. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A (West Supp. 1991).
10. In re A.E.H, 468 N.W.2d 190 (Wis. 1991) cert. denied sub nom. C.C. v. P.C., 112 S.
Ct. 338 (1991).
11. 484 U.S. 174 (1988).
12. Id. at 187.
13. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400 (West 1991).
14. Texas City I.S.D. v. Jorstad, 752 F. Supp. 231 (S.D. Tex. 1990).
15. Id. at 238.
16. 811 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ denied).
17. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.03(i)(1) (West 1991).
18. Tex. S. Con. Res. 69, 67th Leg., 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws 3911.
19. 811 S.W.2d at 734.
20. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.309 (West 1991).
21. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-1225 (1990).
22. Salazar v. Luty, 761 F. Supp. 45 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
23. Id. at 47.
24. Williams v. Lavender, 797 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied).
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malicious actions of a child who is at least twelve years old 25 and therefore it
follows that a fourteen year-old can act maliciously and should be liable for
exemplary damages.2 6 In another tort case the Texas supreme court held
that a child may recover for loss of consortium when a third party causes
serious, permanent, and disabling injury to the child's parent.27
When an underage child marries without parental permission, the proper
remedy is to promptly obtain an annulment.2 8 In Husband v. Pierce29 the
parents tried to obtain possession of their married minor child through a
writ of habeas corpus. After the writ was granted, the husband petitioned
for mandamus relief, which was granted. The court of appeals held that the
daughter had been emancipated by her marriage and therefore, the parents
had no right to obtain her forcible return.30 While a father may have a
protectable interest in his child's last name,31 the court of appeals in Concha
v. Concha 32 held that he does not have a constitutional right to have his
child's surname changed from the mother's to his.33
In order to collect child support from a father, the child's paternity must
be established. In Daniels v. Allen 34 after a finding of paternity, the father
appealed the award of attorney's fees. The court ruled that attorney's fees
were necessaries for the child since the services of an attorney were required
to protect the child's interests.35 In Ussery v. Gray36 the alleged father at-
tempted to have the attorney general's (AG) office disqualified from repre-
senting the mother on the grounds that the AG's office was representing him
in a different support suit. The trial court denied the motion and the appel-
late court affirmed, reasoning that the AG's office, as the state agency that
administers child support collections, is a public service agency that does not
represent clients in the same manner as private attorneys. 37 If the father had
shown actual prejudice he might have won.3 8
After a divorce decree, a party thereto may not later attack the decree. In
Dreyer v. Greene 39 the court of appeals would not permit the mother to at-
tack her children's paternity (after she had twice participated in actions find-
ing that her former husband is the father of her children). 4° However, in
Murdock v. Murdock,4 1 a divorce proceeding, the Texas supreme court held
25. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.01 (West 1991).
26. 797 S.W.2d at 411.
27. Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 468 (Tex. 1991).
28. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.41 (West 1991).
29. 800 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1990, no writ).
30. Id. at 664.
31. In re Baird, 610 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, no writ).
32. 808 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, no writ).
33. Id. at 232.
34. 811 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1991, no writ).
35. Id. at 280.
36. 804 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, no writ).
37. Id. at 236.
38. Id. at 236-237.
39. 809 S.W.2d 262, 263-64 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ).
40. Id. at 264.
41. 811 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tex. 1991).
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that the husband, who had denied paternity, was entitled to a judgment in
his favor after blood test evidence established a zero probability that he was
the father.42 The court held that failure to conduct a pre-trial hearing has
no effect on the substantive rights of the parties. 43 In K.B. v. N.B. 44 the
court of appeals found that the father, by his actions subsequent to his wife's
impregnation, had ratified the parent-child relationship and would be liable
for child support.45 A child born as a result of artificial insemination may be
considered the child of the husband by ratification, even though the husband
had not signed a consent as required by statute.46
Sometimes a man wishes to assert his paternity, but is frustrated by pre-
sumptions that children born into a marriage are the husband's and not
his.47 In Jack v. Jack 48 the court of appeals held that although the plaintiff
was a stranger to the divorce decree and therefore it was not res judicata as
to him, the state's interest in presuming that a husband is the father of his
wife's children was sufficient to overcome any interest the plaintiff might
have.49 The question of presumptions may be clarified by State v. Lavan.50
In that case the child in question had not been mentioned in the divorce
decree and the mother was seeking to hold a man, not her former husband,
liable for child support. The trial court granted summary judgment to the
alleged father and the appellate court affirmed. The court held that a pater-
nity action could not be brought because the child was born during a mar-
riage and so has a presumed father. 5 1 Let us hope that the Texas supreme
court will decide that a man who can be proven to be the biological father of
a child is the child's legal father, with all the rights and responsibilities that a
person of such status should have.
In Tipps v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 52 the district court found on
the basis of DNA fingerprinting that the plaintiff was not the daughter of the
decedent. 53 The court pointed out that the other evidence neither confirmed
nor denied the biological relationship, and the scientific evidence against the
relationship was clear and convincing. 54 The court ordered that the plaintiff
take nothing under the insurance policy. In Dickson v. Simpson 55 the Texas
supreme court held that an adult child allegedly born out of wedlock has a
42. Id. at 560.
43. Id. at 559.
44. 811 S.W.2d 634, 639 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ).
45. Id. at 639.
46. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03 (West 1991).
47. In re M.R.M, 807 S.W.2d 779, 782 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ
denied).
48. 796 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ). If you are interested in writing a
sequel to the television show "Dallas", you might want to look at the facts in this case before
starting to write.
49. Id. at 549.
50. 802 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ granted).
51. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.01 (West 1991).
52. 768 F. Supp. 577 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
53. Id. at 580.
54. Id. at 579.
55. 807 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. 1991).
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right to establish her paternity so that she may inherit.56 The court based its
decision on the fact that the plaintiff never had the opportunity to establish
her paternity because the statutes in effect during her alleged father's lifetime
provided for time limitations that barred her from asserting her rights. The
court, finding that this bar denied her equal protection, reversed and
remanded. 57
IV. CONSERVATORSHIP
In two cases the grant of managing conservatorship to the father was sus-
tained despite the exclusion of some evidence that might have been favorable
to the mother. 58 In DMB 59 an eight year-old child's testimony as to custo-
dial preference was not received because she was not found to be sufficiently
mature.60 In Davis6 1 the failure to admit a social worker's testimony was
held to be harmless error, since the basic facts that she would have supplied
were already before the jury.62
A joint custody order was sustained in Halamka v. Halamka.63 The order
was based on evidence that the father's housing is adequate for himself and
the children, and on the testimony of a child protective specialist that the
father is a nurturing parent.64 In Johnson v. Johnson 65 however, the court of
appeals approved only supervised visitation for the father on the basis of
evidence of alcohol abuse.66
The court of appeals sustained a default judgment against a non-resident
father on the questions of divorce, custody and visitation. 67 However, since
there was no in personam jurisdiction, the questions of child support and
property division could not be addressed. 6 The father, by attacking the
judgment, had entered his appearance, and so the court reversed and re-
manded the support and property questions.69
In Connors v. Connors70 the court of appeals held that it was not required
to find that it would not be in the best interest of the child to award manag-
56. Id. at 727.
57. Id. at 728.
58. In re Marriage of DMB and RLB, 798 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990, no
writ); Davis v. Davis, 801 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
59. 798 S.W.2d at 399.
60. 798 S.W.2d at 403. In Decker v. Hatfield, 798 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. App.-Eastland
1990, writ dism'd w.o.j.), a six year old child's preference was admitted for the purpose of
explaining the expert's own testimony.
61. 801 S.W.2d at 22.
62. 801 S.W.2d at 23.
63. 799 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, no writ).
64. Id. at 355. The court also affirmed the trial court's disposable income finding.
65. 804 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1991, no writ).
66. Id. at 301. In addition the court affirmed an order of $800 per month in child support
based on evidence that the appellant, father, was capable of earning at least $3000 per month.
67. Calvert v. Calvert, 801 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, no writ).
68. Id. at 220.
69. Id. If the father had not wanted to litigate the support question in Texas, he should
have relied on his special appearance to question the court's jurisdiction under Tex. R. Civ. P.
120a and waited for the mother to come to Indiana to obtain child support.
70. 796 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied).
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ing conservatorship to the father before the court could award a joint man-
aging conservatorship to the mother and the maternal grandparents. 71 In
Von Behren v. Von Behren 72 a grandmother was denied standing to bring a
suit for managing conservatorship because she could not prove that there
existed a serious and immediate question concerning the welfare of the chil-
dren in question. 73 The grandmother had alleged that her son, the father of
the children in question, had sexually abused the children. In another case
that also failed in its allegations of sexual abuse, the mother was awarded
attorneys fees and costs, but the appellate court reversed, holding that there
had not been a finding that the Department of Human Services' action to
obtain custody of children believed to have been exposed to sexual abuse was
unreasonable or without foundation. 74
The trial court's appointment of a nonparent as managing conservator
was reversed and remanded in In re W G. W,75 because of a poor jury in-
struction. The trial court had refused to give a definition of the term "signif-
icantly impair." This term is crucial in a case requesting that the natural
parent be denied managing conservatorship so that a nonparent may be ap-
pointed, and failure to provide guidance to the jury is reversible error.76
Bingham v. Bingham 77 is an illustration of the fallacy of the idea that
ordering joint managing conservatorships will minimize the need for court
intervention. The mother with whom the child was domiciled had to change
her domicile in order to be employed. She filed a motion to modify and was
opposed by the child's father, who wanted to be named sole managing con-
servator. The trial court rejected this claim and modified the original order,
finding that the change in domicile was in the best interest of the child. The
father appealed, claiming that the court had not found that the change
would be a positive improvement. The appellate court held that while the
trial court had not used the specific legislative "magic words" in its decree, it
had acted within the spirit of the legislative enactment. 78 There was a simi-
lar result in Talley v. Leach,79 where the trial court modified an Illinois di-
vorce decree. The parents had been named joint managing conservators and
both had subsequently moved to Texas. The court, after a jury trial and
hearing, had changed the domicile of the children and made some adjust-
ments to the visitation schedule. These were not considered such de facto
changes as to require a finding of a material and substantial change in
circumstances.8 0
71. Id. at 239. The mother had suffered a stroke and had severe disabilities.
72. 800 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied).
73. Id. at 923, based on TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.03(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
74. Dallas County Child Welfare Unit of the Tex. Dep't. of Human Serv. v. Black, 812
S.W.2d 620, 624 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no writ).
75. 812 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ).
76. Id. at 417, 421.
77. 811 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, no writ).
78. Id. at 681; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.081(c)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
79. 802 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, writ denied).
80. Id. at 24.
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In MacCallum v. MacCallum 8 a father's motion to change visitation and
child support was denied by the district court, which changed some of the
times of visitation and placed restrictions on the activities of the father dur-
ing visitation. The district court restricted the children, aged eight and nine,
from operating farm equipment, such as tractors and plows, and from being
in any way involved in the mixing or application of herbicides or pesticides
or other farm chemicals. These restrictions would be applicable during any
visitation until the children are fourteen years old. The appellate court af-
firmed all the changes and restrictions, but reversed and rendered as to the
wife's attorneys fees on appeal.8 2 The couple then got into a dispute about
the exact meaning of the visitation schedule and the father was found in
contempt for violating it. The Texas supreme court granted the father a writ
of habeas corpus on the basis that the modified order was not specific enough
to be enforced by a contempt ruling.8 3
In Zemanek v. Boren 8 4 both parties moved to modify joint conservator-
ship to a sole conservatorship. The mother moved for a jury trial, but over
her objections the action was removed from the jury docket. After a bench
trial the father was named sole managing conservator. The mother appealed
and the appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court
had abused its discretion. 5 In Hibler v. Hibler8 6 the appellate court held
that the trial court retained jurisdiction to modify a child custody agreement
some two months after it was entered because of changed circumstances.8 7
In Greene v. Barker8 mandamus was conditionally granted because a mo-
tion to transfer is timely when it is made on or before the Monday after the
expiration of citation or notice of the action or before the commencement of
the hearing, whichever is sooner.89
Enforcing the right to custody of a child can be difficult, especially when
the other party raises the specter of child abuse. In two cases the allegation
of imminent danger was not proved to the satisfaction of the appellate court
and the children were returned to their managing conservators. 9° In Ex
parte Brister9 a mother was held in contempt for failing to deliver the child
to the father in accordance with the divorce decree and she petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus.92 The decree was intended to be flexible so that it
could accommodate the father's fluctuating work schedule. A divided Texas
81. 801 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).
82. Id. at 587.
83. Ex parte MacCallum, 807 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1991).
84. 810 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ).
85. Id. at 12-13.
86. 813 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ).
87. Id. at 525.
88. 806 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1991, orig. proceeding [leave denied].).
89. Id. at 275; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.06(0 (Vernon 1986).
90. Rocha v. Schuble, 809 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ)
(habeas corpus granted); Rosendorf v. Blackmon, 800 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi
1990, no writ) (mandamus granted so that child can be returned to father in accordance with
Wisconsin decree).
91. 801 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1990).
92. Id. at 834.
19921 1879
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
supreme court granted the writ on the basis that the terms of the divorce
decree were not sufficiently clear and unambiguous. 93 There was a dissent
based on the opinion that the decree was sufficiently certain.94
In Weirich v. Weirich 95 the jury granted the mother almost $6,000,000 in
damages from the father and paternal grandmother for the abduction and
concealment of the children for approximately seven years. The father set-
tled before appeal and the appellate court reversed as to the paternal grand-
mother, holding that she did not have actual notice of the decree that
awarded the managing conservatorship to the mother and that there was no
evidence that she assisted in the retaining or concealing of the children. 96
The court also held that there is no cause of action for negligent interference
with a family relationship independent of the Family Code.97
In Briggs v. State 98 a jury found a parent and step-parent guilty of inter-
ference with child custody. The defendants were found to have knowingly
violated a court order that had placed the child in the temporary custody of
Harris County Protective Services.99 The stepfather received a two-year sen-
tence and the mother's two-year sentence was probated.' °0
In In re Wilson 101 the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA) 0 2 was dispositive of the jurisdiction to hear a motion to modify an
Oklahoma child custody decree. The divorce had been in Oklahoma and
custody was awarded to the father who stayed with the children in
Oklahoma. The mother filed for a motion to modify in Texas. The judges of
the two courts conferred by telephone and the Oklahoma judge relinquished
jurisdiction. The appellate court reversed the trial court's finding of jurisdic-
tion on the basis that the children's home state was and is Oklahoma, leaving
the Texas court without jurisdiction. 103
In In re SAV1 °4 the appellate court held that Minnesota had continuing
jurisdiction.10 5 The parties were divorced in Minnesota and the mother
moved to Texas with the children. The court correctly held that, although
under the UCCJA both states would have concurrent jurisdiction, under the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act,' °6 which is a federal statute and
preempts state law, only Minnesota has continuing jurisdiction and therefore
its decrees are entitled to full faith and credit. 0 7 The court also held that
93. 801 S.W.2d at 834-35.
94. Id. at 836.
95. 796 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ granted).
96. Id. at 519. There was, however, evidence that the children visited the grandmother on
at least two occasions during their concealment.
97. Id. at 515, citing to TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 36.02 (Vernon 1986).
98. 807 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd).
99. Id. at 651.
100. Id. at 649.
101. 799 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1990, no writ).
102. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.51-.75 (Vernon 1986).
103. 799 S.W.2d at 774.
104. 798 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990, writ granted).
105. Id. at 296.
106. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A (West Supp. 1990).
107. 798 S.W.2d at 296.
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child support requires in personam jurisdiction and since the father had ap-
peared in the Texas court, that portion of the Texas decree would be
affirmed. 10 8
V. SUPPORT
The child support guidelines °9 seem to be effective, since there have been
few appeals from the amount of support originally ordered. In Kahn v.
Kahn 110 a husband's threat to file bankruptcy was not considered "good
cause" for awarding a lump sum as child support.11  The court of appeals
stated that a finding of "good cause" for a lump sum award must be related
to the needs of the child. 112 Lahar v. Lahar113 presages a problem that will
continue to plague the courts if they do not coordinate among themselves
support orders for different children of the same obligor. In Lahar the court
of appeals held that a trial court need only consider the number of children
actually before the court when setting child support. 14 The court held that
before the trial court must consider another child, there needs to be a finan-
cial obligation to that child under a court order." 5 Since the support award
is set at a relatively high amount, 16 when the father is ordered to pay child
support for his second child in another court, that court will either have to
set a low support amount or ignore the other court's order and cause the
father to have difficulty paying the two support orders. 17 The money con-
sumed in appealing different courts' orders would be better spent on the
children.
Cole v. Joliet 118 illustrates the proposition that a trial court's decrees will
not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. 119 The same finding was made
in Stocker v Magera,120 where the award was only half the amount of child
support required by the guidelines, and in Belcher v. Belcher,12 1 where the
award was increased above the guidelines. This was also the case in two
108. Id. at 300.
109. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.052 (West 1991).
110. 813 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, no writ).
111. Id. at 709-10.
112. Id. at 709.
113. 803 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, no writ).
114. Id. at 469.
115. Id.
116. Id. The order was for $350 per month for one child based on net resources of
$1,768.70. In Martin v. Martin, 797 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, no writ) the
father was required to pay only $300 per month on net resources of $1,000 per month for three
children.
117. See Escue v. Escue, 810 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. App-Texarkana 1991, no writ), reversing
a child support modification for failing to take into consideration the appellant's prior child
support obligation to another child by ruling of another court. The other court's award had
also been reversed and remanded for failing to consider the number of children appellant had
in determining appropriate amount of child support obligation. Escue v. Reed, 790 S.W.2d 717
(Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, no writ).
118. 804 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. App--Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
119. Id. at 201.
120. 807 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, writ denied).
121. 808 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, no writ).
1992] 1881
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
other cases, 12 2 which affirmed an increase in child support and held that this
increase was not prevented by a contract relating to the amount of child
support. In Worford v. Stamper 123 the Texas supreme court reversed the
appellate court, holding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in
increasing child support and extending it beyond the child's eighteenth
birthday in view of the child's special needs. 124
A trial court may also refuse to either raise 125 or lower 126 a child support
order. It is reversible error, however, for a court to fail to state its findings
with regard to child support. 27 Courts may not approve parents' self-help
arrangements to reduce child support arrearages through contractual agree-
ments.1 28 The court reasoned that permitting parents to agree to the reduc-
tion of arrearage amounts would result in the encouragement of the non-
payment of child support.' 29 There were two concurrences and a dissent.
Enforcement of child support decrees can be very difficult, but failure to
notify the obligor of the date of the trial when the obligor has a meritorious
defense will not result in a collection of support, but rather in a bill of re-
view. 130 In Jones v. Igna1131 the husband contended that the trial court did
not have jurisdiction over him because, although he filed a general appear-
ance to the original contempt motion, he was not served with a citation re-
garding a later motion to have the past due child support reduced to
judgment. The appellate court held that under the statutory provisions in
effect at that time, the trial court retained jurisdiction to award relief.' 32
The appellate court also held that the husband's support obligation was not
automatically reduced upon an older child's attaining majority and affirmed
the trial court's judgment.' 33 In Gross v. Gross 134 the court of appeals also
held that the burden for reducing child support when a child is emancipated
122. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 805 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied);
In re Marriage of Edwards, 804 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1991, no writ).
123. 801 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. 1990).
124. Id. at 109-10.
125. Woodley v. Bruton, 796 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1990, writ denied).
126. State v. Hernandez, 802 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ). The
case was reversed and remanded in part because there was no provision for specific payment of
arrearages or medical insurance.
127. Hanna v. Hanna, 813 S.W.2d 626, 628 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no
writ).
128. Williams v. Patton, 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 65 (Nov. 2, 1991), affirming 796 S.W.2d 526
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990). In Coke v. Coke, 802 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Civ. App-
Dallas 1990, writ denied) the court held that an oral agreement between the parties that each
parent would support the child residing in the parent's respective home is void as against
public policy, since it would permit the reduction of child support without court approval. Id.
at 276.
129. 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 67.
130. State v. Buentello, 800 S.W.2d 320, 326 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
The trial court's grant of a bill of review was reversed on the issue of attorney's fees, since the
state was really not a party to the underlying cause of action, which is the existence of mar-
riage and a need for a divorce. The state intervened only because its interest in the child
support issue was at risk.
131. 798 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ denied).
132. Id. at 900.
133. Id. at 902-03.
134. 808 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. App-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ).
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rests on the obligor,' 35 and that the court could order wage withholding to
clear up the arrearages. 136
Unless money given to an obligee is for the purpose of providing actual
support of the child, it cannot be used as an offset to arrearages for child
support. 137 In Medrano v. Medrano the money was given to the obligee for
payments relating to the use and purchase of a car. The court of appeals
held that these payments did not constitute actual support of the child.
When a support order is entered in a Revised Uniform Reciprocal En-
forcement of Support (RURESA) action, it does not modify the original or-
der unless the second order specifically so provides.1 38 Thus the original
order may later be enforced. 1 39 In a RURESA suit for ongoing support and
arrearages a court should order, in its assignment of the obligor's earnings a
sum sufficient to liquidate the payments in arrears, and should also provide
continuing support."40 In another RURESA case the court ordered child
support, but held that it did not have jurisdiction to order visitation and the
appellate court affirmed since Texas is not the child's home state.141 In
Omick v. Hoerchler 142 the court of appeals enforced a foreign child support
judgment applying the Missouri statute of limitations because judgment
would not be time barred in Missouri, although it would be barred in Texas.
In Schnitzius v. Koons 1,3 an obligee had to go to rather extreme lengths to
collect child support that was owed to her. The obligor had filed an appear-
ance bond in connection with a contempt motion and was released. When
the obligor did not appear for the hearing, the obligee filed a motion seeking
forfeiture, which was granted, and the surety failed to appeal. More than six
months later, the surety moved to vacate the order and after a hearing this
was granted. The obligee then filed for mandamus to compel the court to
reinstate its judgment of forfeiture, which was conditionally granted because
the surety's time for filing for a new trial had expired. 44
In Ex parte Boetscher 145 the court of criminal appeals held that it was a
denial of equal protection to enhance the crime of non-support of a child
from a misdemeanor to a felony for non-residents only.146 The statute cov-
ers not only residents who flee the state to avoid support, but also those who
are residents of another state and remain there after the child in need of
support happens to move to Texas.147 For Texas residents the crime is
135. Id. at 219.
136. Id. at 221.
137. 810 S.W.2d 426, 427 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ).
138. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 21.31 (West 1991).
139. State v. Borchers, 805 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied).
140. Clanton v. Clanton, 807 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1991, no writ.)
141. Brown v. Jarvis, 808 S.W.2d 628, 631 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ denied).
142. 809 S.W.2d 758, 759-60 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied).
143. 813 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no writ). The amount of money involved
in this complicated case is $2000.
144. Id. at 218.
145. 812 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
146. Id. at 603.
147. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.05 (West 1991).
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merely a misdemeanor. ' 48 The court held that this distinction is unconstitu-
tional and therefore Texas lacks jurisdiction. 149 In what might be consid-
ered a companion case, State v. Paiz,15o the court of criminal appeals, on
facts similar to Boetscher, in an en banc opinion held that the sixth amend-
ment vicinage provision' 51 is irrelevant in child support cases since the crime
is committed in the state where the child resides, rather than where the obli-
gor resides. The court then held that based on this appeal Texas has juris-
diction. The court further stated that it was expressing no opinion as to
other constitutional limitations on jurisdiction citing Boetscher.152
Orders for support must be clear and specific both as to their terms and
the underlying basis for them, or a contempt order will fail. 153 A written
order of commitment is required to sustain imprisonment for contempt 54
and a person, after being found in contempt by a master, is entitled to be
heard on any contested issues by a trial judge before being found in noncom-
pliance. 155 A visiting judge who has been appointed for a specific time pe-
riod cannot issue a contempt order after the time has expired, and any order
thus issued is considered void.156 A contempt order will be reformed if it
increases the punishment after there has been a delay in the imposition of the
order, to permit the relator to purge himself although he previously failed to
do so. 157
If the support provisions are sufficiently specific, then contempt is avail-
able and a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted. 158 Even though the
obligor cannot pay the full arrearages, if he can make the partial payments
as ordered or has the ability to pay by borrowing, and fails to do so, he can
be confined.' 59 Criminal contempt is proper when a relator fails to comply
with a court order to produce documents in court, and the relator may be
jailed immediately. 16
148. Id.
149. 812 S.W.2d at 603-04.
150. 817 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
151. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed
.U. S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
152. 812 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
153. Exparte Clark, 813 S.W.2d 696, 697 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ);
Ex parte Thompson, 803 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ).
154. Ex parte Cadena, 811 S.W.2d 725, 726 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ).
155. Ex parte Haskin, 801 S.W.2d 12, 13 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
156. Ex parte Holland, 807 S.W.2d 827, 829-30 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no writ).
157. Ex parte Balderas, 804 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ).
158. Exparte Wessell, 807 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. App--Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ); ex
parte Johns, 807 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no writ); ex parte Tamez, 801 S.W.2d
18 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
159. Ex parte Duncan, 796 S.W.2d 562 (Tex.App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1990, no writ)
(probation is a proper remedy where obligor cannot pay the full arrearage, but can keep cur-
rent and pay something extra towards reducing the arrearage); ex parte Bregenzer, 802 S.W.2d
884 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ) (obligor had not proved inability to pay
when he had not asked his wife, a legal secretary, to lend him the money to pay the support).
160. Ex parte Friedman, 808 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, no writ).
1884 [Vol. 45
FAMILY LAW. PARENT AND CHILD
VI. TERMINATION AND ADOPTION
The attorney general, in response to a query concerning the Open Records
Act's effect on the disclosure of the original birth certificate of an adopted
person, concluded that it did not affect the confidentiality provisions relating
to adoption records.' 6' Thus the information in the original birth certificate
may not be disclosed by the Bureau of Vital Statistics without a court order,
even though, as in the instant case, fifty years have passed since the filing of
the original birth certificate. 16 2
In Prokopuk v. Offenhauser 16 3 the court of appeals held that the failure of
a father to support his child before he is sure that he is the father of the child
cannot be grounds for the termination of his parental rights.' 64 The father
had sought to legitimate his child and the mother had cross-claimed to ter-
minate his rights. In Nichols v. Nichols ' 65 the default judgment terminating
a father's parental rights was reversed for failure to appoint a guardian ad
litem to represent the child. 166 The father had filed for termination alleging
that he was not the biological father of the child. The mother neither an-
swered nor appeared. The appellate court ruled that in this circumstance
there was no one present to represent the child, and so the appointment of a
guardian ad litem was mandatory.' 67
In Smith v. Sims, 168 a maternal grandmother was successful in terminat-
ing the parental rights of the father and adopting her grandchildren. 69 The
court of appeals held that the father's murder of the mother and the holding
hostage of the children for three days thereafter was a course of conduct that
endangered the children and met the statutory requirements for termina-
tion.' 70 In Coleman v. Smallwood 171 a natural mother's change of mind
came too late for her to prevent an adoption. She had signed a voluntary
relinquishment that was irrevocable for sixty days,' 72 and although she
changed her mind the day after signing, the termination proceeding took
place within the allotted time and the court held that it was valid. 17 The
natural mother contested the finding on two other grounds, but neither was
successful. The first was that she was a minor and the second, that the attor-
ney ad litem was appointed on the day of the trial and so could not have
adequately represented the child. The appellate court held that the statute
permitting a minor to contract away her parental rights is constitutional' 74
161. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-596 (1991).
162. Id.
163. Prokopuk v. Offenhauser, 801 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ
denied).
164. Id. at 539-40.
165. 803 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, no writ).
166. Id. at 485-86.
167. Id.
168. 801 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ).
169. Id. at 250-51.
170. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02 (West 1991).
171. 800 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, no writ).
172. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.03 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
173. 800 S.W.2d at 359.
174. Id. at 357.
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and that the appointed attorney ad litem was so experienced that he was able
to properly represent the child.1 75 In Rodriguez v. Lutheran Social Services
of Texas, Inc. 176 the natural parents were successful in having the question
of termination of their parental rights reversed and remanded.1 77 The
agency, when it applied to be appointed managing conservator, had failed to
include a statement about compliance or lack of compliance with the Inter-
state Compact for the Placement of Children178 and the appellate court held
that the testimony to explain the noncompliance was not sufficient. 179
A court may terminate the parent-child relationship based on an affidavit
of relinquishment or for cause. In In re R.L.C. 180 the court of appeals held
that both methods were available to the trial court.' The mother claimed
that the court should have inquired into her mental capacity before ac-
cepting her relinquishment since she suffered from a schizophrenic disorder,
although there was no evidence of this at the time of the signing of the affida-
vit. In any event, there were sufficient grounds that the court could have
ordered an involuntary termination of her parental rights. In Slatton v. Bra-
zoria County Protective Services Unit 182 the court of appeals held that an
earlier denial of a termination of the parent-child relationship was not res
judicata as to a later cause of action, as long as the termination was based on
actions of the parents that occurred after the earlier denial.18 3
In Texas Department of Human Services v. White' 8 4 the Texas supreme
court, in a per curiam opinion, held that the inclusion of a picture of the
child with his foster family was not such a denial of the mother's rights as to
require a reversal. '85 The case was remanded to the appellate court for con-
sideration of the factual sufficiency points. Relying on a rule of civil proce-
dure, ' 86 the Dallas court of civil appeals held that it could not consider a
statement of facts that had been filed too late and so had to presume that
there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings that termination
of the parent-child relationship was proper.' 87
In Texas Department of Human Services v. E.B. 18 8 the Texas supreme
court in its zeal to use broad-form jury questions, nullified the due process
provisions of the carefully crafted section on involuntary termination of pa-
rental rights.' 8 9 That section when carefully read states that a court must
175. Id. at 359.
176. 814 SW.2d 153 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied).
177. Id. at 156.
178. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.08(d) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
179. 814 S.W.2d at 156.
180. 800 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
181. Id. at 656.
182. 804 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, no writ).
183. Id. at 555.
184. 817 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. 1991).
185. Id. at 53.
186. TEX. R. App. P. 54(c) (West 1991).
187. Krasniqi v. Dallas County Child Protective Servs. Unit of Texas Dept. of Human
Servs., 809 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied).
188. 802 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. 1990).
189. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02 (West 1991).
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find enough evidence on one of the listed grounds to terminate, as well as
find that termination is in the best interest of the child. When there are two
possible grounds for termination, as was pointed out by the court of appeals,
using a broad-form question makes it impossible to know if a majority of the
jury made a finding concerning either ground, and so it could be that there
were not sufficient facts to support the termination of the parent-child rela-
tionship. The Texas supreme court, however, overlooked this problem and
ruled that a broad-form submission asking if the parent-child relationship
should be terminated is proper.190
In Kellogg v. Martin 191 the grandparents of a child, who were the subjects
of a termination of parental rights proceeding, were able to have all the or-
ders vacated because they had made a timely objection to the assignment of
a visiting judge.' 92 The grandparents had standing because the child had
been in their possession for more than six months. 193 In Neal v. Texas De-
partment of Human Services 194 the appellate court reversed a termination of
the mother's parental rights on the grounds that she was subjected to undue
influence when she signed a voluntary relinquishment of parental rights.' 95
The court held that the caseworker did not act improperly, but from the
testimony of the caseworker it appeared that the mother's husband may have
coerced her into signing, and so the evidence was not clear and convincing
that there was a voluntary relinquishment.196
VII. CONCLUSION
Looking back over the fifteen years or so that these Survey articles have
been written, it appears that while some of the law has changed, the underly-
ing problems remain the same. Some family problems may have been cre-
ated by the law, but most have merely been somewhat exacerbated or
minimized by legal intervention.
The length and detail of the Family Code has been increased over the
years, as the legislature has added all sorts of provisions for the determina-
tion of the amount and then the collection of child support payments. The
legislature has also tried to restrict the discretion of the trial courts by estab-
lishing guidelines for such things as visitation197 and support. 198 There has
been a diminution of fights over venue since the rules on transfers were en-
acted,' 99 thanks to strict enforcement by the courts. 2°°
The United States Supreme Court has done more than its share to under-
mine the stability of the family, while mouthing all sorts of platitudes about
190. 802 S.W.2d at 648-49.
191. 810 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, no writ).
192. Id. at 305.
193. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.03(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 1991),
194. 814 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied).
195. Id. at 218-19.
196. Id. at 222.
197. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.032, .033 (West 1991).
198. Id. § 14.055.
199. Id. § 11.06.
200. See, e.g., Walker v. Miller, 729 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
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traditional family values. 20 ' Its greatest negative achievement, however, has
been in the area of interstate child custody battles, where it has claimed
exclusive jurisdiction to settle disputes,20 2 and has then refused to do so. 20 3
The most affirmative change that has taken place in our society is the
increasing desire of fathers of children born out of wedlock to assert their
rights.20 4 In addition the courts, through their interpretation of the consti-
tution and the statutes, have made it possible for these children to enforce
their inheritance rights.20 5
The number of custody fights has not decreased. The concept of joint
custody is not only flawed, but judging by the number of requests for modifi-
cation that joint custody decrees generate, it would appear to be a failure. 2° 6
A return to sole managing conservatorship with legislatively imposed re-
strictions on modification seems to be the better solution. 20 7
Support is an area in which there is an appearance of progress, since nu-
merous obligors have been held in contempt, while others have had their
wages garnished as provided by the statute.20 8 Since the motivation for
these rulings is an attempt to shift the burden of child support from the
taxpayer to the father, it is not at all certain that the children have benefited.
Finally, the area of termination and adoption is one that can best be de-
scribed as a tale of unmitigated woe. Successful adoptions never get to court
and the unsuccessful ones are harrowing. The facts in involuntary termina-
tion of parental rights cases are quite disturbing, to say the least, but since
this matter is serious, it is perhaps a good thing that these judgments are not
rendered lightly. All in all, however, these cases tend to reinforce the belief
that the law can neither protect children nor put dysfunctional families back
together again.
201. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
202. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988).
203. In re A.E.H., 468 N.W.2d 190 (Wis. 1991), cert. denied sub nom. C.C. v. P.C., 112 S.
Ct. 338 (1991).
204. See e.g., In re M.R.M. & E.E.M., 807 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1991, writ denied).
205. See e.g., Dickson v. Simpson, 807 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. 1991).
206. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
207. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(c) (West 1991).
208. Id. § 14.43.
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